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Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on how a country’s legal origin influences the 
operation of its financial system by using firm-level survey data on the obstacles that firms face in 
raising external finance.  The paper assesses two channels through which legal origin may 
influence the financial system. It finds that the adaptability of a country’s legal system is more 
important for explaining the obstacles that firms face in accessing external finance than the 





Substantial research finds a robust relationship between the origin of a country’s 
legal tradition and the operation of its financial system. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, henceforth LLSV) show that whether a country’s 
Commercial/Company law is based on British, French, German, or Scandinavian legal 
origins is important for explaining cross-country differences in aggregate measures of 
financial development, such as the size of the banking sector and national stock market 
capitalization.
1 At the microeconomic level, empirical work suggests that legal systems 
influence the external financing constraints faced by firms.
2 
Hayek (1960) emphasizes two major differences across legal traditions that may 
help account for the relationship between legal origin and the functioning of the financial 
system: (1) the political independence of the judiciary and (2) the adaptability of the legal 
system. The “political” --or “judicial independence” -- channel holds that (a) the 
protection of private property rights forms the basis of financial activities and (b) legal 
traditions differ in terms of the priority they attach to private property rights vis-à-vis the 
rights of the State. According to Hayek (1960), Dawson (1960, 1968), Merryman (1985), 
and others, the English Common law evolved as an independent institution that over time 
protected private property owners against the crown. This made private agents more 
confident about making financial transactions, with positive ramifications for financial 
development.
3 In contrast, LLSV (1999) argue that the French and German civil codes in 
the 19
th century were constructed to solidify state power. Over time, state dominance of 
the judiciary produced legal traditions that focus more on the power of the state and less 
on the rights of individual investors, with negative ramifications for financial  
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development (Mahoney, 2001). Thus, the political channel argues that the degree to 
which the judiciary is independent of the State is a legal system trait that substantively 
shapes the financial environment, including the ease with which firms can contract to 
raise external finance. 
Hayek (1960) also argues that legal systems differ in terms of their ability to adapt 
to changing conditions. The “adaptability channel” stresses that (a) legal traditions that 
adapt efficiently to minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the economy and 
the legal system’s capabilities will more effectively foster financial development in 
general and external finance in particular than more rigid systems and (b) legal traditions 
differ in their ability to evolve with changing conditions. An influential, although not 
unanimous, strand of the comparative law literature holds that the common law evolves 
efficiently as judges respond case-by-case to unforeseen and changing conditions 
(Posner, 1973). Several scholars argue that since the common law grants substantial 
discretion to judges, inefficient laws are challenged in the courts and through repeated 
litigation efficient rules replace inefficient ones.
4 In contrast, Dawson (1960, 1968) and 
Merryman (1985) argue that the French Revolution sought to change French law 
radically by (i) eliminating jurisprudence, (ii) reducing judges to a purely administrative 
role, and (iii) adhering to strict, formal legal processes that reduce judicial flexibility. 
These scholars add that, since the more rigid aspects of the Napoleonic legal doctrine did 
not work well in practice and conflicted with France’s long legal history, the French 
courts eventually circumvented many of the inflexible characteristics of the doctrine. 
Unlike France, however, Merryman (1985, 1996) argues that many French Legal Origin 
colonies have been unable to shed the inefficient rigidity of the Napoleonic doctrine.  
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Germany explicitly rejected the Napoleonic approach. Rather, building on Savigny’s 
vision of legal science, Germany took a comparatively favorable view of jurisprudence 
and sought to create a responsive legal doctrine. Similarly, the Scandinavian countries did 
not follow the rigid Napoleonic approach (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998). The adaptability 
channel, therefore, argues that the flexibility of the legal system – as characterized by the 
level of jurisprudence and legal formalism -- will shape financial contracting and hence 
corporate financing obstacles.  
This paper contributes to a growing empirical literature on why legal origin 
matters by studying which legal system traits –judicial independence from the 
government and the ability of courts to adapt to changing conditions -- influence the 
obstacles that firms face in raising capital. Thus, this paper provides empirical evidence 
on the linkages running from legal origin, to specific legal system traits, and on to 
particular obstacles that firms report they confront in contracting for external finance. 
While Beck et al. (2003a) examine the importance of the political and adaptability 
channels in explaining cross-country differences in aggregate indexes of bank and stock 
market development, this paper examines firm-level survey data on the obstacles that 
firms face in raising external finance. One of the functions performed by a well-
functioning financial system is to facilitate the flow of credit to firms. Thus, to provide 
additional evidence on why legal origin matters, we examine the comparative importance 
of the political and adaptability channels in explaining specific barriers to firms obtaining 
external finance.
5 
To measure empirically the political and adaptability channels, we use indexes of 
(1) the political independence of the judiciary and (2) the adaptability of legal systems.  
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To measure political independence of the judiciary, we use information on the degree of 
tenure of Supreme Court judges and the extent to which the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over cases involving the government. To measure the adaptability of legal 
systems, we use information on the extent to which judicial decisions are sources of law 
and whether judicial processes are based on principles of equity rather than purely on 
statutory law and legal formalities. Although we use the raw data from Djankov et al. 
(2003) to construct the adaptability indexes, our adaptability indexes differ from the 
Djankov et al. (2003) measure of legal formalism. Djankov et al. (2003) seek to measure 
legal formalism broadly defined. In contrast, we focus narrowly on the Hayek (1960), 
Dawson (1960, 1968), Posner (1973), and Merryman (1985) conception of legal system 
adaptability, which highlights the role of case law and not adhering too rigidly to 
statutory law in making judgments. Thus, the adaptability index is a subset of the 
Djankov et al. (2003) legal formalism index that only uses information on the degree to 
which rulings must be based solely on existing statutes and the extent to which judgments 
may include general assessments of fairness.
6  We then test whether these measures of 
the political and adaptability mechanisms explain the obstacles that firms face in raising 
external finance.  
To measure financing obstacles, we use firm-level survey data for over 4,000 
firms across 38 countries. The data come from the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES), which was conducted in 1999. We include information on how firms respond to 
questions about the general financing obstacles they face in raising capital, the degree to 
which collateral requirements impede firms’ access to finance, the extent to which bank 
bureaucracy and paperwork represents an important barrier to obtaining external finance,  
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and difficulty in having access to long-term loans. Thus, we assess whether different 
legal tradition traits – political independence of the judiciary and legal system 
adaptability – explain specific obstacles that firms report they confront in obtaining 
external finance. 
This paper is related to four recent papers seeking to discover which legal system 
characteristics facilitate economic interactions. First, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-
Eleches and Shleifer (2004) show that judicial independence and jurisprudence are 
associated with greater economic and political freedom and that judicial independence is 
a channel through which the Common law tradition influences economic freedom. Rather 
than examining economic and political freedom, we examine the impact of judicial 
independence and legal adaptability on firm financing obstacles. Second in a cross-
country study of former European colonies, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) examine the 
impact of legal formalism and the risk of expropriation of private foreign investors by the 
government on income per capita, investment, and financial development. They find that 
while legal formalism influences the form of financial contracting, expropriation risk 
affects investment and income. In contrast, our firm-level study assesses which legal 
system traits influence the financing obstacles reported by firms. Third, Djankov et al. 
(2003) examine the influence of judicial formalism on the duration, efficiency and 
fairness of judiciary proceedings. Thus, they examine the impact of judicial formalism on 
the operation of the legal system. Djankov et al. (2003) show that Civil Code countries 
have more formalistic legal systems than Common law countries and find that firms rate 
the efficiency of the court system higher in countries with less formalistic legal systems. 
In contrast, our paper concentrates on the effect of two legal system characteristics – the  
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political independence of the judiciary and the adaptability of the judicial system -- on the 
relationship between borrowers and lenders and thus the obstacles that firms face in 
accessing external finance. Finally, as noted above, Beck et al. (2003a) find that the 
adaptability channel is more important than the political channel in explaining aggregate 
indexes of bank and stock market development. In this paper, however, we use firm-level 
data to assess the importance of the political and adaptability channels in explaining 
corporate financing obstacles. 
It is important to recognize that many researchers disagree with the reasoning 
advanced in both the political and adaptability channel arguments, and these disputes 
further motivate our analyses. In contrast to the contention that legal origin shapes 
judicial independence and hence a country’s approach to private property, Pagano and 
Volpin (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) contend that the comparative powers of 
different political interest groups, which are likely to vary over time, influence and reflect 
national approaches to private contracting. Furthermore, some scholars reject the 
contention that case law-based legal systems respond more effectively than more 
statutory-based systems (e.g., see Cooter and Kornhauser, 1980; Cooter, Kornhauser, and 
Lane, 1979; Blume and Rubinfeld, 1982; Rubin, 1982; Kaplow, 1992; and Coffee, 2000). 
For instance, as exemplified by the law on contracts for the benefit of third parties, 
English law has clung with remarkable tenacity to the principle that “only a person who 
is a party to a contract can sue on it.” (ZK. 1998, p. 468) In contrast, the civil law 
countries granted greater rights to third parties through statutory changes. This paper 
focuses on assessing empirically the linkages running from legal origin, to legal system  
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characteristics, to the financing obstacles faced by firms. We naturally, therefore, provide 
evidence on these competing views regarding law and finance. 
Furthermore, some may argue that the political and adaptability channels are 
inextricably intertwined. While the political and adaptability views of why legal origin 
matters for finance are not mutually exclusive, they emphasize different mechanisms. 
The political channel focuses on the political independence of the judiciary. The 
adaptability channel focuses on the process of law making. Nevertheless, the two 
channels may be so interrelated that neither exerts an independent impact on firm 
financing obstacles. This is an empirical question that we address. 
A number of methodological concerns need to be noted. First, we use survey data, 
where firms subjectively report financing obstacles. Thus a firm facing the same 
obstacles in two different countries may report different obstacles for reasons that do not 
depend on actual constraints. Although it is not clear that this would bias the results in 
any particular direction, we discuss evidence on the validity of the survey information 
below. A second and related methodological issue involves the measures of financing 
obstacles. None of the four measures is ideal. The general financing obstacle indicator 
captures a firm’s broad assessment about the degree to which external financing 
constraints impede the operation and growth of the firm, but the indicator does not 
measure a specific inefficiency in the contracting environment. Furthermore, while we 
examine more specific financing impediments, such as collateral requirements, the 
availability of long-term finance, and the extent of bank paperwork and bureaucracy, 
each of these measures may miss crucial elements of how the legal system affects firms’ 
ability to contract for external finance. While fully recognizing these limitations, we  
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believe that (a) moving from the aggregate measures of financial development used by 
Beck et al. (2003a) to firm-level indicators of financing obstacles provides addition 
evidence on how legal origin influences the operation of the financial system, (b) 
measurement concerns are mitigated by using a range of firm responses regarding 
different financing obstacles, and (c) there are material advantages to using firm level 
responses rather than alternative measures of firm financing constraints, which we 
discuss in the next section. Third, the adaptability channel is inherently dynamic in that it 
focuses on the efficient flexibility of legal systems. We use purely cross-sectional data on 
jurisprudence and legal formalism as proxies for adaptability, but we unfortunately do not 
have time-series information on the comparative degree of efficient legal system 
adaptability for a broad cross-section of countries. Pistor et al. (2000) and Keinan (2000) 
provide detailed comparisons of the evolution of statutes regarding corporate law and the 
law on secured transactions for a few key countries, but more research would be useful 
along these lines.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data 




To assess the relation between legal system traits and firms’ access to finance, we 
combine firm-level survey data with country-level indicators on the operation of legal 
systems. The intersection of these databases produces a sample of over 4,000 firms and 
38 countries. Table 1 presents observations by country. Table 2 gives descriptive 
statistics and correlations.  
2.1. Firm’s access to finance 
The corporate finance literature has used different approaches for inferring the 
degree to which firms that are financially constrained. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988) use a priori reasoning to argue that low-dividend firms are constrained. Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) use the external financing patterns of US firms as a benchmark for the 
“natural” dependence of industries on external financing around the world. Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) rely on a financial planning model to identify firms that 
have access to long-term external financing.  
Rather than inferring financing constraints indirectly, we use direct measures of 
the obstacles that firms report contracting for external finance. We use firm-level survey 
data from the WBES for over 4,000 firms in 38 countries, both developed and 
developing, for three reasons. First, the survey acquires direct information from firms 
about perceived obstacles and therefore does not infer the existence of financing 
constraints from other information. Second, the survey not only has information on 
general financing obstacles. It also provides information on the specific types of obstacles 
that firms face in financial contracting, such as collateral requirements, paperwork and 
access to long-term financing. Third, the WBES database has excellent coverage of small  
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and medium size firms (as well as large firms), while other cross-country studies use data 
that focus heavily on large corporations. 40% of the firms in the sample are small 
(between 5 and 50 employees), another 40% medium-sized (between 51 and 500 
employees) and the remaining 20% large firms (over 500 employees).  
Although using data based on self-reporting by firms may produce concerns that a 
firm facing the same obstacles will respond to questions differently in different 
institutional and cultural environments, we do not believe the survey nature of the data is 
distorting the results. First, if this were pure measurement error, it would bias the results 
against finding a relationship between legal system traits and firms’ obstacles in financial 
contracting. Also, Hellman et al. (2000) show that in a sub-sample of 20 countries there is 
a close connection between responses and measurable outcomes, and they find no 
systematic bias in the survey responses. Furthermore, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2005) show that reported financing obstacles slow firm growth. Thus, 
firms’ responses to the survey on financing obstacles are capturing more than 
idiosyncratic differences in how firms rank obstacles.  Finally, legal system traits could 
hurt economic growth opportunities without influencing firms’ access to capital.  Firms 
in countries with worse opportunities may blame this on financing obstacles.  Thus, the 
causal mechanism may run from legal characteristics to growth opportunities to reported 
lack of access and not from legal characteristics to actual lack of access.  Below, 
however, we show that the results hold even when controlling for growth opportunities, 
as measured by the overall level of economic development as well as recent rates of 
economic growth.    
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  General Financing Obstacle equals the response to the question: “How 
problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary 
between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major 
obstacle). Table 1 shows that perceived financing obstacles do not only vary across firms 
within a country, but also across countries. Portuguese firms rate financing obstacles as 
relatively insignificant (1.73), while firms in Haiti rate financing obstacles as more than 
moderate (3.51).
7  
Collateral Requirements equals the response to the question: “How problematic 
are collateral requirements of banks/financial institutions for the operation and growth of 
your business?: (1) no obstacle, (2) a minor obstacle, (3) a moderate obstacle, or (4) a 
major obstacle?”  Collateral has been shown to help overcome adverse selection and 
moral hazard risks in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985). The ability 
of the lender to effectively recover and re-sell collateral thus determines availability and 
terms of credit. Legal systems across countries vary in the types of assets that can be used 
as collateral and in the way the lender can recover collateral (Keinan, 2000). We will 
assess whether collateral requirements as part of financial contracting constitute an 
obstacle for firm growth across different legal traditions and whether judicial 
independence and legal system adaptability help overcome this obstacle. 
Long-term Loans equals the response to the question: “How problematic is the 
lack of access to long-term loans for the operation and growth of your business?: (1) no 
obstacle, (2) a minor obstacle, (3) a moderate obstacle, or (4) a major obstacle?” One of 
the major functions of financial intermediaries is to transform short-term savings into 
long-term investment resources (Levine, 1997). Informational asymmetries with the  
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resulting adverse selection and moral hazard risks, however, hamper this maturity 
transformation. Previous research has shown that loans to firms in financially less 
developed countries have significantly lower maturity (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1999). We assess whether difficulties in contracting for long-term finance vary across 
legal traditions and whether judicial independence and legal system adaptability help ease 
access. 
Paperwork and Bureaucracy equals the response to the question: “How 
problematic is bank paperwork or bureaucracy for the operation and growth of your 
business?: (1) no obstacle, (2) a minor obstacle, (3) a moderate obstacle, or (4) a major 
obstacle?” Paperwork and bureaucracy constitute transaction costs for both borrower and 
lender. We therefore assess whether the degree to which firms report paperwork as major 
problem in financial contracting varies across legal traditions and is related to judicial 
independence and legal system adaptability.  
The four firm-level financing obstacles indicators – General Financing Obstacle, 
Collateral Requirements, Long-term Loans, and Paperwork/Bureaucracy -- are 
significantly, positively correlated with each other (Table 2B).  The correlation 
coefficient ranges from 0.34 to 0.60.  This suggests that each financial obstacle indicator 
provides independent information on the barriers that firms report they face in raising 
capital. 
2.2. Firm-level Control Variables 
The regressions control for several firm characteristics. Specifically, the analyses 
include dummy variables, indicating whether the firm is partially owned by the 
government or a foreign entity. Similarly, the regressions include dummy variables  
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indicating whether a firm (i) exports, (ii) is in the manufacturing sector, and (iii) is in the 
services sector. The study controls for firm size by including the log of sales in United 
States dollars (USD). The regressions control for the market structure by including the 
number of competitors the firm faces. Finally, the investigation includes indicators of the 
governance system for each firm. Specifically, the regressions include dummy variables 
indicating whether the firm is (i) a single proprietorship or partnership or (ii) a 
corporation. Cooperatives and other legal forms are captured in the constant. Further, the 
analysis includes dummy variables indicating whether major decisions are primarily 
made by (i) an individual or a family, (ii) its board of directors or (iii) its management. 
The constant captures control by a conglomerate, a bank, workers or government. 
    Government-owned firms constitute 5% of the sample, while foreign-owned 
firms constitute 26%.  34% of the firms are controlled by its board, 13% by management 
and 40% by an individual or family. 31% of the firms are single proprietorships or 
partnership, while 46% are corporations. Manufacturing firms constitute 40% of the 
sample and service firms 44%. On average, firms face 2.1 competitors. The correlations 
in Table 2C indicate that government and foreign-owned firms, firms controlled by its 
board, corporations, service firms and larger firms face lower financing obstacles, while 
family-controlled firms, single proprietorships and partnerships and firms with more 
competition face higher financing obstacles. Many of the firm characteristics are also 
highly correlated with each other. 
2.3. Indicators of Legal Origin, Judicial Independence and Legal Adaptability 
  French Legal Origin equals one if the country’s Company/Commercial law has 
French legal origin and zero otherwise.
8 Similarly, we define the dummy variable British  
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Legal Origin, which takes on the value one if the country has a British common law 
tradition as defined by LLSV (1999) and zero otherwise (so that Sweden and Germany 
have values of zero). 
  Tenure of Supreme Court Judges ranges from zero to two, increasing in the 
tenure of the Supreme Court judges. If tenure is for less than six years, then this variable 
is coded as zero. If tenure is between six years and lifelong, then the Tenure of Supreme 
Courts Judges variable is coded as one. If Supreme Court judges have lifelong tenure, 
then the variable is coded as two. In a legal system that grants longer tenure to Supreme 
Court judges, this increases the independence of the judiciary relative to the State. 
According to the political channel, firms in countries with more independent judiciaries 
will face lower obstacles in accessing and contracting for external finance. This indicator 
of the tenure of Supreme Court judges and the next indicator regarding the relative power 
of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive and legislature is from La Porta, et al. (2004).  
  Supreme Court Power combines the tenure of Supreme Court Judges with a 
dummy variable indicating whether the Supreme Court has power over administrative 
cases, i.e. cases involving the government. Thus, Supreme Court Power equals one if (1) 
Supreme Court Judges have lifelong tenure and (2) the Supreme Courts has power over 
administrative cases and equals zero if either of these two conditions does not hold. To 
the extent that the Supreme Court is independent of the government as measured by 
lifelong tenure and has control over cases involving the government, this represents 
greater judicial power relative to the State. The political channel predicts that Supreme 
Court judges who have life-long tenure and power over administrative cases are more  
 16
independent from the State, with positive repercussions for firms’ access to external 
finance.  
  Case Law (La Porta et al., 2004) is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
judicial decisions are a source of law. The adaptability channel predicts that countries in 
which judicial decisions are a source of law will adapt more easily to changing economic 
and financial circumstances with beneficial impacts on the operation of the financial 
system. 
  Legal Justification (Djankov et al., 2003) indicates whether the legal process is 
based on statutory law rather than on principles of equity.
 9  Specifically, Legal 
Justification is the normalized sum of three dummy variables: (1) Complaint measures 
whether the complaint is required to include references to the applicable laws, legal 
reasoning or other formalities that normally require legal training or assistance, (2) 
Judgment indicates whether the judgment must expressly state the applicable law or case 
law for the decision, and (3) Law vs. Equity indicates whether judgment has to be based 
on statutory law or can rather be motivated by general equitable arguments. Legal 
Justification takes on values of 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1, where higher values signify the legal 
system imposes greater requirements that the legal process be based on statutory law. The 
adaptability channel predicts that firms in countries where judicial decisions are based 
purely on statutory law rather than principles of equity face greater rigidities in writing 
contracts that facilitate the flow of external capital to firms.  
    Firms in French legal origin countries report higher financing obstacles due to 
collateral requirements, access to long-term loans and paperwork and bureaucracy (Table 
2B). Also, firms face lower financing obstacles in countries where (i) judicial decisions  
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are a source of law, (ii) court decisions are based on principles of equity rather than 
solely on statutory law, and (iii) where Supreme Court judges enjoy longer tenures. There 
is no correlation between Supreme Court Power and firms’ financing obstacles. 
  British legal origin countries are more likely to have judicial decisions as a source 
of law and to have judicial decisions based on principles of equity rather than based only 
on statutory law (Table 2B). British legal origin countries also have Supreme Court 
judges that have longer tenure and are more powerful. The opposite holds for French 
Legal Origin countries. The correlations also indicate, however, that judicial 
independence and adaptability of the legal system are highly correlated with each other, 
which might make it difficult to distinguish the effect of the two.  
3. Methodology 
To assess the relation between legal system characteristics – judicial 
independence from the government and legal system adaptability -- and firms’ access to 
finance, we assume that the enterprise’s underlying response can be described by the 
following equation, where the j and k subscripts indicate firm and country respectively: 
 
General Financing Obstaclej,k = β 1 Governmentj,k + β 2 Foreignj,k + β 3 Exporterj,k +  β 4 
Privatej,k + β 5  Corporationj,k + β 6  Familyj,k + β 7  Boardj,k + β 8  Managementj,k + β 9 
Manufacturingj,k + β 10 Servicesj,k + β 11 Salesj,k +β 12 No. of Competitorsj,k +β 13 GDP per 
capitak  +β 14 Lawk  + ε                               
 
Law is either French Legal Origin, or one of our judicial independence from the 
government or legal adaptability measures. 
Importantly, we control for GDP per capita in all of the regressions.  To the extent 
that a more independent judiciary and a more adaptable legal system reflect a generally 
higher level of economic and institutional development, any relation between legal  
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system traits and firms’ financing obstacles might be a spurious reflection of the level of 
economic development. The regressions, therefore, include the log of GDP per capita. As 
shown in Table 2B, firms in richer countries face lower obstacles raising external finance.   
Unlike the underlying variable, the observed variable General Financing Obstacle 
is a polychotomous dependent variable with a natural order. Specifically, the enterprise 
classifies the obstacle with k = 1, 2, 3, or 4 if the underlying variable is between α k-1 and 
α k+1., with the α -vector being estimated together with the coefficient vector β . We 
therefore use the ordered probit model to estimate equation (1). We use standard 
maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  The 
coefficients, however, cannot be interpreted as marginal effects of a one-unit increase in 
the independent variable on the dependent variable, given the non-linear structure of the 
model. Rather, the marginal effect is calculated as φ (β ’x)β , where φ  is the standard 
normal density at β ’x. We use the same estimation procedure when using (a) the 
importance of collateral requirements in accessing finance, (b) the importance of the lack 
of access to long-term loans and (c) the importance of bank paperwork and bureaucracy 
for obtaining external finance as dependent variables. 
4. Results 
4.1. Legal Origin and Firms’ Access to Finance 
The results in Table 3 indicate that firms in French Legal Origin countries face 
larger obstacles to accessing external finance than firms in Common law countries. 
Specifically, firms in French Legal Origin countries report higher obstacles due to 
collateral requirements, the lack of access to long-term loans and bank paperwork and 
bureaucracy. While the French Legal Origin dummy enters significantly only at the 8%  
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level in the General Financing Obstacle regression, it enters significantly at the 5% level 
in the regressions of Collateral Requirements, Long-term Loans and Paperwork and 
Bureaucracy. We get similar results when we (i) use the British Legal Origin dummy – 
firms in Common Law countries face lower financing obstacles than firms in Civil Code 
countries – and (ii) when we leave out Germany and Sweden and thus focus exclusively 
on British Legal Origin versus French Legal Origin countries.  
The effect of legal tradition on firms’ access to finance is not only statistically, 
but also economically significant. The probability that a firm in a French Legal Origin 
country rates collateral requirements as major obstacle is two percentage points higher 
than in other countries; the probability that it rates the lack of access to long-term loans as 
major obstacle is 10 percentage points higher and the probability that it rates paperwork 
and bureaucracy as major obstacle is seven percentage points higher. 
The results in Table 3 also indicate that foreign-owned and large firms face lower 
financing obstacles than domestic or small firms, while incorporated and family-owned 
firms face particularly high obstacles. Finally, firms in economically more developed 
countries face lower obstacles than firms in countries with lower levels of GDP per 
capita.  
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4.2. Firms’ Access to Finance, Legal Adaptability and Judicial Independence 
Table 4 presents regressions that assess whether legal system adaptability and 
judicial independence from the government influence the obstacles that firms face in 
raising external finance. For each financing obstacles variable – General Financing 
Obstacle, Collateral Requirements, Long-Term Loans, and Paperwork and Bureaucracy -, 
we present four regressions. We present regressions with one of the two adaptability 
channel indexes and one of the two political channel indexes. We present all 
combinations. As noted, the regressions control for firm-level characteristics and the 
level of GDP per capita. For brevity, we only report the country-level variables. 
The Table 4 regressions indicate that firms in countries with more adaptable legal 
systems face lower financing obstacles than countries with more rigid legal systems. Case 
Law and Legal Justification enter significantly at the five percent level and with the 
expected sign in all but one regression; Legal Justification enters significantly at the 10% 
level when controlling for Supreme Court Power. Thus, these results are consistent with 
the adaptability channel view of why legal origin matters for financial development. 
In contrast, the Table 4 results do not lend strong support to the political channel 
view of why legal origin matters for firm financing obstacles. There is not a robust 
relation between judicial independence and firms’ access to finance. Supreme Court 
Power either enters insignificantly or with the opposite sign of that predicted by the 
political channel view. Supreme Court Tenure only enters significantly and negatively in 
the regressions of Collateral Requirements. While we do not find evidence that judicial 
independence explains firms’ access to finance, this does not imply that judicial 
independence is an unimportant feature of legal systems. Our findings only focus on the  
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impact of judicial independence on financial contracting, whereas legal system traits may 
influence a wide array of economic and political outcomes (La Porta, et al. 2004). 
  As in the case of legal tradition, the economic impact of legal adaptability on 
firms’ access to finance is large. The probability that a firm reports financing as a major 
obstacle is five percentage point lower in countries that use judicial decisions as sources 
of laws. Similarly, the probability that a firm reports financing as a major obstacle to firm 
growth is four percentage points lower in countries that base judicial decisions on 
principles of equity rather than statutory law. The corresponding numbers for Collateral 
Requirements, Long-term Loans and Paperwork and Bureaucracy are four, four, and six 
percentage points for Case law and seven, 15 and 11 percentage points for Legal 
Justification. These are conservative estimates since we report the results from the 
regressions that yield the smallest economic impact. The results indicate that Case Law 
has an especially strong impact on paperwork and bureaucracy as a financing obstacle, 
while Legal Justification has an especially strong impact on access to long-term funding. 
  In sum, there are three main findings in Tables 3 and 4.  First, firms in French 
Legal Origin countries face higher obstacles in accessing and contracting for external 
finance. Second, firms in countries with more adaptable legal systems face lower 
financing obstacles. Finally, variations in judicial independence do not explain a 
significant amount of the cross-country variation in the external financing obstacles faced 
by firms.   
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4.3. Robustness Tests 
In Tables 5-8, we check the robustness of these results by controlling for (i) 
creditor rights, (ii) rule of law, (iii) growth, (iv) inflation, (v) the measurement of the 
financing obstacles, and (vi) the availability of finance.  
First, to assess the strength of the independent relationship between reported 
financing obstacles and the adaptability channel, we control for specific legal codes that 
protect the rights of creditors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Specifically, we want to assess 
whether broad legal system traits, such as adaptability and judicial independence, matter 
or whether firms’ financing obstacles are driven by specific legal codes. Creditor Rights 
measures the rights that secured creditors have vis-à-vis firms in restructuring and 
liquidation.  
The results in Table 5 show that legal adaptability explains firms’ access to 
finance even after controlling for the statutory rights of creditors. Case Law enters all 
eight of the regressions in which it is included negatively and significantly. This is 
consistent with the view that jurisprudence fosters efficient legal system adaptability and 
reduces the gap between financial needs and legal system capabilities. As predicted by 
the adaptability channel, Legal Justification enters all of the Collateral Requirements, 
Long-term Loans, and Paperwork and Bureaucracy regressions significantly at the 5% 
level. Consistent with the results noted earlier, the link between Legal Justification and 
General Financing Obstacle is not as strong. In terms of the political channel, the 
indicators of judicial independence enter significantly at the 5% level and with the 
expected sign in only three out of 16 regressions. Finally, when controlling for legal  
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system characteristics, Creditor Rights only enters significantly and negatively in the 
regressions where the dependent variable is of Paperwork and Bureaucracy.  
Second, to provide additional information on the strength of the independent link 
between reported financing obstacles and legal system adaptability, we control for a 
general indicator of the efficiency of the legal system.  We use the Rule of Law indicator 
compiled by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
The Table 6 results suggest that the earlier findings are robust: Case Law and 
Legal Justification enter significantly at the 5% level and with the expected sign in 12 of 
the 16 regressions, which is consistent with the earlier findings and supports the 
adaptability channel. The indicators of judicial independence, on the other hand, enter 
either insignificantly or with a sign opposite to the one predicted by the political channel. 
Rule of Law enters significantly and negatively in 12 out of the 16 regressions, but does 
not affect the significance of our legal adaptability indicators. This suggests that these 
indicators capture specific legal system traits beyond the general efficiency of the legal 
system as measured by the Rule of Law. 
Third, economic growth and inflation could influence the results and lead to 
spurious findings. Perhaps the legal system influences growth but does not influence 
access to finance.  However, firms in growing countries may report that financing 
obstacles are less of a constraint than firms in slow growing countries even though the 
actual contracting environment is similar. Thus, we control for real per capita GDP 
growth over the period 1995-1999.  Furthermore, firms in low inflation environments 
may face easier contracting conditions.
10  Thus, we control for the rate of inflation.  
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The Table 7 results, however, show that the results are robust to controlling for 
GDP growth and inflation. Case Law and Legal Justification enter significantly at the 5% 
level and with the expected sign in 15 of the 16 regressions. However, the indicators of 
judicial independence enter mostly either insignificantly or with the “wrong” sign. 
Growth enters significantly and negatively in all regressions, while inflation enters 
significantly only in the Collateral Requirements regressions, but surprisingly with a 
negative sign. Again, these robustness checks are broadly consistent with the adaptability 
channel but do not provide empirical support for the political channel. 
Fourth, the Table 8 results indicate that our findings are robust to the 
measurement of the obstacles. Specifically, we reclassify responses according to whether 
firms rate an obstacle (i) as minor or non-existing or (ii) as moderate or major. We 
convert the obstacle variables into dummy variables, with the new variables taking the 
value zero if the underlying obstacle is one or two and taking the value one if the 
underlying obstacle is three or four. Then we run a probit regression. Again, the results 
confirm the conclusions discussed above. When we use random effect probit estimations, 
to control for a potential country-specific error term, the results are confirmed.  
Fifth, we were concerned that the results could be driven only by the supply of 
intermediated funds, rather than financing obstacles. Thus, we used an additional firm-
level variable from the survey as a regressor in the analyses. The survey asked firms, “Is 
banks' lack of money to lend: (1) no obstacle, (2) a minor obstacle, (3) a moderate 
obstacle, or (4) a major obstacle?” Including this additional control variable, however, 
did not change the results on the channels through which legal origin influences reported 
financing obstacles. While we do not report these regressions to save space, the  
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regression results are very similar to those reported above. Although the “lack of money” 
indicator enters all of the obstacle regressions significantly and positively, we continue to 
find that legal system adaptability is negatively associated with reported firm financing 
obstacles, while the indicators of judicial independence are unrelated to the financing 
obstacles.  
We ran two further robustness tests. Since the number of firms varies 
substantially across countries, we assess the robustness of the results using a weighted 
ordered probit. The weights are the inverse of the number of firms to correct for this 
potential bias. The weighted regressions confirm the earlier conclusions. Also, excluding 
Germany and Sweden from our sample, thereby focusing only on French and British 




This paper assessed the relationship between measures of two, key legal system 
traits –judicial independence and the adaptability of the legal system -- and the obstacles 
that firms report they face in contracting for external finances.  First, the data indicate 
that firms in French Legal Origin countries face higher obstacles in contracting for 
external finance than firms in other countries, which suggests that legal heritage exerts a 
powerful influence over firms’ access to finance. Second, as documented by Djankov et 
al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (2004), French Legal Origin countries tend to have (a) 
judiciaries that are less independent from the government and (b) judiciaries that less 
likely to embrace jurisprudence and to base judicial decisions on principles of equity 
rather than purely on statutory law than countries with a common law tradition. Thus, 
consistent with Hayek (1960), Dawson (1960, 1968), and Merryman (1985), legal 
heritage helps explain contemporary legal system characteristics.  Third, cross-country 
variation in legal system adaptability – the degree to which judicial decisions are a source 
of law and are based on equity rather than statutory law – helps explain variation in the 
obstacles that firms report they face in accessing external finance. Finally, cross-country 
variation in judicial independence does not help explain differences in firms’ financing 
obstacles. These findings provide empirical confirmation of the adaptability channel, but 
do not lend much support for the political channel. In general, the results emphasize that 
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1 For more on the links between legal origin and financial development, see Levine (1998, 1999, 2003). 
Moreover, research finds that legal institutions influence the efficiency with which financial systems 
allocate capital (Wurgler, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002), the valuation of firms (LLSV 2002 and Caprio et 
al., 2003), the dividend payment policies of corporations (LLSV 2000), the efficiency of equity markets 
(Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000), and the financial fragility of firms (Johnson, et al., 2000). Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine (2003b) document the robust connection between legal origin and equity market 
development and the property rights protection. Also, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine 
and Loayza (2000) establish that the component of financial development explained by legal origin 
explains economic growth. See Beck and Levine (2004) for a survey of the law and finance literature. 
2 See Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 2002), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Beck and Levine 
(2002). 
3 Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) show that countries with strong private property rights 
protection tend to have firms that reinvest their profits, but where property rights are relatively weakly 
enforced, entrepreneurs are less inclined to invest retained earnings. 
4 See, Rubin (1977, 1982), Priest (1977), and Bailey and Rubin (1994).  
5 For two fascinating case-studies of the importance of judicial independence in England and the United 
States, see Klerman and Mahoney (2004) and Berkowitz and Clay (2004) respectively.  They do not, 
however, consider the potential role of the adaptability channel. 
6 Thus, our adaptability index does not include information on the degree to which laymen are involved in 
dispute resolution, the extent of oral versus written presentations in legal proceedings, and the number of 
procedural steps, which are part of the formalism index. The correlation between our adaptability index and 
Djankov et al.’s (2003) formalism index is 72% and statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, 
using the formalism index produces the same conclusions. 
7 Overall, 31% of the firms in our sample rate financing as major obstacle, 26% as a moderate obstacle, 
21% as a minor obstacle, and 21% as no obstacle. 
8 Except for Sweden and Germany, LLSV (1998, 1999) classify the remainder of the countries in our 
sample as Common Law countries. As discussed, Hayek (1960), Dawson (1960, 1968), and Merryman 
(1985) emphasize the distinction between French Legal Origin countries and other countries, particularly 
British common law countries. Hence, we include Sweden (Scandinavian law country) and Germany 
(German law country) as zeros in the French legal origin dummy variable. Note, however, that eliminating 
Germany and Sweden from the sample does not change this paper’s results. Since Germany and Sweden 
are the only representatives of the German and Scandinavian legal traditions in the sample, we do not 
capture them in separate dummies. 
9 Djankov et al. (2003) use survey data from law firms in 109 countries to construct indicators of the 
functioning of the legal system when courts confront cases involving the eviction of tenants for non-
payments of rent and the collection of a bounced check.  
10 Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) show that countries with higher and more volatile inflation have lower 
levels of financial development, a relation that is robust to controlling for reverse causation and 
























Court Power  Legal Origin 
Argentina 8,000  3.02  2.75  2.80 3.18  1  1  2  1  F 
Brazil 4,492  2.69  2.89  3.01 2.91  0  1  2  1  F 
Canada 20,549  2.06  2.08  2.38 1.50  1  0  2  1  B 
Chile 5,003  2.47  2.37  2.36 2.43  0  0.67  2  1  F 
Colombia 2,381  2.69  2.81  2.67 2.92  0  1  1  0  F 
Ecuador 1,538  3.32  2.85  2.92 3.52  1  0.67  2  1  F 
Egypt 1,108  3.00  2.46  2.82   0  1  2  1  F 
Ethiopia 109  2.94  3.11  2.79   0  2   1  F 
France 27,720  2.80  2.30  2.96 1.71  0  1  2  0  F 
Germany 30,794  2.53  2.71  2.55 2.14  1  1  2  0  G 
Ghana 393  3.08  2.33  2.52   1  0  2  1  B 
Haiti 369  3.51  2.75  2.12 3.35  0  1   0  F 
Honduras 708  2.86  2.84  2.58 3.18  1  1  0  0  F 
India 414  2.52  2.48  2.54   1  1  2  1  B 
Indonesia 1,045  2.86  2.52  2.53 2.76  1  0.67  2  1  F 
Italy 19,646  2.11  2.44  2.49 1.88  0  1  2  0  F 
Kenya 339  2.85  2.35  2.27   1  0.33  2  1  B 
Malaysia 4,536  2.66  2.66  2.39 2.27  1  0  2  1  B 
Mexico 3,395  3.37  2.87  2.96 3.56  0  1  1  0  F 
Nicaragua 435  3.17  2.97  2.94 2.89  0  1   0  F 
Nigeria 254  3.11  2.26  2.33   1  0.33  2  1  B 
Pakistan 506  3.33  3.21  2.95 2.94  1  0.67  2  1  B 
Panama 3,124  2.10  2.40  2.51 1.88  0  1  1  0  F 
Peru 2,335  3.03  2.71  2.91 3.40  1  1  2  1  F 
Philippines 1,126  2.68  2.65  2.29 2.38  1  1  2  1  F 
Portugal 11,582  1.74  1.59  1.85 1.78  1  1  2  0  F 
Singapore 24,948  1.86  1.98  1.78 1.62  1  0  2  1  B 
South Africa  3,925  2.46  1.79  1.77   1  0.33  2  1  B 
Spain 15,858  2.27  1.91  2.21 1.83  0  1  2  1  F 
Sweden 28,258  1.88  2.08  1.63 1.44  1  0.33  2  0  S 
Thailand 2,836  3.09  2.42  2.37 3.14  0  0.67  2  0  B 
Turkey 2,994  3.20  2.42  2.49 3.02  1  0.67  2  0  F 
Uganda 324  3.13  2.66  2.58   1  0.67  2  1  B 
United 
Kingdom 20,187  2.24  2.17  2.11 1.68  1  0.33  2  1  B 
United States  29,250  2.29  2.11  2.40 1.66  1  0.33  2  1  B 
Venezuela 3,483  2.50  2.82  2.88 2.77  0  1  1  0  F 
Zambia 394  2.67  2.68  2.43   1  0.33  2  1  B 
Zimbabwe 693  3.05  2.07  2.29   1  0.67  2  1  B 
 
Note: GDP per capita is real GDP per capita, averaged over 1995-99. General Financing Obstacle is the response to 
question whether financing is an obstacle to the operation and growth of the firm. Answers vary between 1 (no 
obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Collateral requirements, Long-term 
Loans and Paperwork and Bureaucracy are defined similarly. Tenure of Supreme Court Judges indicates the length of 
tenure of Supreme Court judges. Supreme Court Power is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if Supreme 
Court Judges have life-long tenure and jurisdiction over administrative cases. Case Law is a dummy variable that 
takes on the value one if judges base their decision on case law. Legal Justification indicates whether judgments are 
based on statutory law rather than on principles of equity. F indicates French legal origin, C Common legal origin, G 




Table 2. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Obs  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
General Financing Obstacle  3704  2.69 3 1.12 1  4 
Collateral  3733  2.52 3 1.10 1  4 
Long-term  loans  2743  2.52 3 1.22 1  4 
Paperwork  3760  2.52 3 1.03 1  4 
Government  4111  0.05 0 0.21 0  1 
Foreign  4111  0.26 0 0.44 0  1 
Exporter  4111  0.43 0 0.50 0  1 
Board  4111  0.34 0 0.47 0  1 
Management  4111  0.13 0 0.34 0  1 
Family  4111  0.40 0 0.49 0  1 
Private  4111  0.31 0 0.46 0  1 
Corporation  4111  0.46 0 0.50 0  1 
Manufacturing  4111  0.40 0 0.49 0  1 
Services  4111  0.44 0 0.49 0  1 
Sales 4111  15.79  15.79  4.65  -2.12  25.33 
No.  competitors  4111 0.76 0.69 0.31  0  2.20 
GDP per capita  38  7,501  2,915  9,961  109  30,794 
British  Legal  Origin  38  0.39 0 0.50 0  1 
French  Legal  Origin  38  0.55 1 0.50 0  1 
Caselaw  38  0.63 1 0.49 0  1 
Legal  justification  35  0.68 0.67 0.36  0  1 
Supreme  Court  Tenure  38  1.79 2 0.47 0  2 
Supreme  Court  Power 38  0.63 1 0.49 0  1 
Creditor rights  29  2.34  2   1.56  0  4 
Rule  of  Law  38  4.05 4 1.29 2  6 
GDP  growth  38  1.32 1.61 1.72 -2.46 4.24 
Inflation 38  10.78  6.89  12.67  -0.40  58.05 
 
Note: General Financing Obstacle is the response to question whether financing is an obstacle to the operation and 
growth of the firm. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major 
obstacle). Collateral requirements, Long-term Loans and Paperwork and Bureaucracy are defined similarly. 
Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership 
and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Private and Corporation 
are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is (i) a single proprietorship or a partnership or (ii) a corporation. 
Family, Board and Management are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is controlled by (i) and 
individual or family, (ii) its board, or (iii) its management.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales 
is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. 
GDP per capita is real GDP per capita, averaged over 1995-99. French legal origin and British legal origin are 
dummy variables that take on the value one for countries with a French Legal Origin tradition and a British Legal 
Origin tradition, and zero otherwise Tenure of Supreme Court Judges indicates the length of tenure of Supreme Court 
judges. Supreme Court Power is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if Supreme Court Judges have life-
long tenure and jurisdiction over administrative cases. Case Law is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if 
judges base their decision on case law. Legal Justification indicates whether judgments have to be based on statutory 
law rather than on principles of equity. Creditor rights is an indicator of the rights of secured creditor in the 
restructuring or liquidation of a company. Rule of Law is an indicator of the extent to which the population of a 
country trusts in the legal system to uphold their legal rights. GDP growth is averaged over 1995 –99 and inflation is 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Government  -0.117 -0.026 -0.224 -0.228 
  (0.160) (0.802) (0.010)***  (0.013)** 
Foreign  -0.268 -0.146 -0.250 -0.075 
  (0.000)*** (0.010)*** (0.000)*** (0.086)* 
Exporter  0.027 0.024 -0.035  -0.052 
  (0.502) (0.625) (0.381) (0.178) 
Private  -0.011 -0.042 0.128  0.050 
  (0.850) (0.598) (0.027)**  (0.374) 
Corporation  0.239 0.193 0.273 0.197 
 (0.001)***  (0.035)**  (0.000)***  (0.005)*** 
Family  0.236 0.086 0.246 0.145 
 (0.000)***  (0.297)  (0.000)***  (0.016)** 
Board  0.135 0.074 0.059 0.045 
 (0.011)**  (0.216)  (0.241)  (0.363) 
Management  -0.024 -0.110 -0.140 -0.187 
 (0.634)  (0.069)*  (0.005)***  (0.000)*** 
Manufacturing  -0.102 -0.200 -0.004 0.015 
 (0.050)*  (0.010)***  (0.935)  (0.770) 
Services  -0.144 -0.246 -0.032 -0.060 
  (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.559)  (0.249) 
Sales  -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
No. competitors  -0.065  0.049  -0.155  0.030 
  (0.318) (0.557) (0.016)**  (0.641) 
GDP per capita  -0.176  -0.288  -0.114  -0.067 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
French Legal Origin  0.071  0.314  0.082  0.265 
 (0.078)*  (0.000)***  (0.045)**  (0.000)*** 
Observations  3704 2743 3733 3760 
 
Note: The underlying model is: Obstacle = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Private + β 5  Corporation + β 6 Family +β 7 Board + β 8 
Management + β 9 Manufacturing + β 10 Services + β 11 Sales +β 12 No. of Competitors +β 13 GDP per capita + +β 14 French legal origin  + ε. Managers 
were asked about the obstacles they face to the growth and operation of their firm. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 
(moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or 
foreign ownership and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Private and Corporation are 
dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is (i) a single proprietorship or a partnership or (ii) a corporation. Family, Board and Management 
are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is controlled by (i) and individual or family, (ii) its board, or (iii) its management.  
Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number 
of competitors the firm has. French legal origin is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for countries with French Legal Origin tradition 
and zero otherwise. The regression is run with ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are 
reported in parentheses.  























GDP per capita  -0.187  -0.188  -0.178  -0.176  -0.102  -0.111  -0.091  -0.094 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Case law  -0.167  -0.137      -0.142  -0.166     
 (0.001)*** (0.009)***   (0.003)***  (0.001)***     
Legal justification      0.159  0.123      0.251  0.291 
     (0.022)**  (0.098)*      (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.023    0.084    -0.104    -0.109   
  (0.650)    (0.114)    (0.034)**   (0.033)**  
Supreme Court Power    -0.063    -0.034    0.021    0.034 
    (0.174)    (0.485)   (0.650)   (0.479) 





















GDP per capita  -0.344  -0.333  -0.333  -0.320  -0.065  -0.050  -0.059  -0.035 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.039)** 
Case law  -0.138  -0.135      -0.230  -0.296     
 (0.015)**  (0.022)**      (0.000)***  (0.000)***    
Legal justification      0.525  0.564      0.455  0.551 
     (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.067    0.047    0.039    0.017   
 (0.285)    (0.474)    (0.449)    (0.752)   
Supreme Court Power    0.023    0.071    0.175    0.184 
   (0.650)    (0.216)    (0.000)***    (0.000)*** 
Observations  2246 2246 2115 2115 2978 2978  2806  2806 
 
Note: The underlying model is: Obstacle = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Private + β 5 Corporation + β 6 
Family +β 7 Board + β 8 Management + β 9 Manufacturing + β 10 Services + β 11 Sales +β 12 No. of Competitors +β 13 GDP per 
capita + β 14 Law + ε. Managers were asked about the obstacles they face to the growth and operation of their firm. Answers 
vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are 
dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy 
variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Private and Corporation are dummy variables that indicate whether the 
firm is (i) a single proprietorship or a partnership or (ii) a corporation. Family, Board and Management are dummy variables 
that indicate whether the firm is controlled by (i) and individual or family, (ii) its board, or (iii) its management.  
Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the 
logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Law is one of four variables. Tenure of Supreme Court Judges indicates 
the length of tenure of Supreme Court judges. Supreme Court Power is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if 
Supreme Court Judges have life-long tenure and jurisdiction over administrative cases. Case Law is a dummy variable that 
takes on the value one if judges base their decision on case law. Legal Justification indicates whether judgments are based on 
statutory law rather than on principles of equity. The regression is run with ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and 




Table 5. Financing Obstacles, Legal Adaptability and Judicial Independence: 
























GDP per capita  -0.200  -0.215  -0.186  -0.215  -0.117  -0.119  -0.094  -0.100 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Creditor  rights  -0.019 -0.021 -0.012 -0.025 -0.023  -0.035  -0.002  -0.021 
  (0.326) (0.229) (0.540) (0.188) (0.215)  (0.039)**  (0.933)  (0.247) 
Case law  -0.171  -0.150      -0.119  -0.153     
 (0.003)*** (0.013)**     (0.031)**  (0.008)***     
Legal justification      0.137  0.064      0.241  0.245 
     (0.085)*  (0.454)      (0.002)***  (0.003)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  -0.107    -0.192    -0.195    -0.269   
 (0.349)    (0.084)*    (0.071)*    (0.010)**   
Supreme Court Power    -0.094    -0.125    0.042    0.040 
    (0.081)*    (0.019)**   (0.429)   (0.447) 





















GDP per capita  -0.377  -0.397  -0.321  -0.340  -0.117  -0.089  -0.080  -0.048 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.019)** 
Creditor  rights  -0.017  -0.024  0.052 0.027 -0.079 -0.078 -0.047 -0.049 
  (0.403) (0.234) (0.025)**  (0.214) (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.016)**  (0.005)*** 
Case law  -0.204  -0.199      -0.243  -0.297     
 (0.002)*** (0.003)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)***    
Legal justification      0.658  0.619      0.394  0.493 
     (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  -0.198    -0.356    0.139    -0.001   
 (0.098)*    (0.002)***  (0.209)    (0.990)   
Supreme Court Power    -0.108    -0.011    0.201    0.208 
   (0.061)*    (0.859)    (0.000)***    (0.000)*** 
Observations  1935 1935 1935 1935 2509 2509  2509  2509 
 
Note: The underlying model is: Obstacle = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Private + β 5 Corporation + β 6 
Family +β 7 Board + β 8 Management + β 9 Manufacturing + β 10 Services + β 11 Sales +β 12 No. of Competitors +β 13 GDP per 
capita + β 14 Law + β 15 Creditor Rights + ε. Managers were asked about the obstacles they face to the growth and operation of 
their firm. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). 
Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero 
if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Private and Corporation are dummy 
variables that indicate whether the firm is (i) a single proprietorship or a partnership or (ii) a corporation. Family, Board and 
Management are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is controlled by (i) and individual or family, (ii) its board, or 
(iii) its management.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of 
Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Law is one of four variables. Tenure of Supreme 
Court Judges indicates the length of tenure of Supreme Court judges. Supreme Court Power is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value one if Supreme Court Judges have life-long tenure and jurisdiction over administrative cases. Case Law is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value one if judges base their decision on case law. Legal Justification indicates whether judgments 
are based on statutory law rather than on principles of equity. Creditor Rights is an index of the extent to which secured 
creditors are protected in the case of restructuring or liquidation of a company. The regression is run with ordered probit. 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6.Financing Obstacles, Legal Adaptability and Judicial Independence: 
























GDP per capita  -0.155  -0.155  -0.140  -0.144  -0.088  -0.091  -0.066  -0.063 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** 
Rule  of  Law  -0.059 -0.057 -0.063 -0.050 -0.028  -0.036  -0.042  -0.050 
 (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)** (0.034)** (0.214)  (0.092)*  (0.093)*  (0.033)** 
Case law  -0.153  -0.113      -0.137  -0.153     
 (0.002)*** (0.031)**     (0.004)***  (0.002)***     
Legal justification      0.120  0.079      0.227  0.250 
     (0.087)*  (0.302)      (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.061    0.127    -0.086    -0.078   
 (0.259)    (0.024)**    (0.100)*    (0.149)   
Supreme Court Power    -0.075    -0.044    0.014    0.025 
    (0.105)    (0.367)   (0.761)   (0.606) 





















GDP per capita  -0.245  -0.231  -0.279  -0.275  -0.024  -0.013  -0.008  0.008 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.204) (0.503) (0.709) (0.724) 
Rule  of  Law  -0.142 -0.141 -0.073 -0.059 -0.082  -0.068  -0.087  -0.071 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.030)** (0.075)*  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** 
Case  law  -0.063  -0.035      -0.216 -0.272    
  (0.284)  (0.568)      (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Legal  justification      0.454  0.490    0.406  0.493 
     (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.102    0.081    0.095    0.081   
  (0.110)   (0.229)   (0.080)*   (0.153)   
Supreme Court Power    -0.030    0.053    0.163    0.172 
   (0.556)   (0.367)    (0.000)***    (0.000)*** 
Observations  2246 2246 2115 2115 2978  2978  2806  2806 
 
Note: The underlying model is: Obstacle = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Private + β 5 Corporation + β 6 
Family +β 7 Board + β 8 Management + β 9 Manufacturing + β 10 Services + β 11 Sales +β 12 No. of Competitors +β 13 GDP per 
capita + β 14 Law + β 15 Rule of Law + ε. Managers were asked about the obstacles they face to the growth and operation of 
their firm. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). 
Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero 
if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Private and Corporation are dummy 
variables that indicate whether the firm is (i) a single proprietorship or a partnership or (ii) a corporation. Family, Board and 
Management are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is controlled by (i) and individual or family, (ii) its board, or 
(iii) its management.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of 
Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Law is one of four variables. Tenure of Supreme 
Court Judges indicates the length of tenure of Supreme Court judges. Supreme Court Power is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value one if Supreme Court Judges have life-long tenure and jurisdiction over administrative cases. Case Law is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value one if judges base their decision on case law. Legal Justification indicates whether judgments 
are based on statutory law rather than on principles of equity. Rule of law is a survey-based country-level variable of the 
degree to which its citizen trust the legal system to uphold their rights. The regression is run with ordered probit. Detailed 
variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
  
Table 7. Obstacles to Growth, Legal Adaptability and Judicial Independence: 

























GDP per capita  -0.164  -0.154  -0.138  -0.105  -0.089  -0.097  -0.066  -0.044 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.027)** 
Growth  -7.109 -7.183 -9.264 -9.857 -9.876  -10.014  -11.932 -13.414 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Inflation  0.397 0.360 0.296 0.298 -1.103  -0.956  -1.137  -0.949 
  (0.068)*  (0.104) (0.177) (0.180) (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Case law  -0.139  -0.136      -0.068  -0.102     
 (0.006)*** (0.012)**     (0.157)  (0.046)**     
Legal justification      0.192  0.228      0.257  0.359 
     (0.006)*** (0.003)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.087    0.184    -0.131    -0.089   
 (0.096)*    (0.001)***  (0.011)**    (0.098)*   
Supreme Court Power    0.029    0.135    0.032    0.147 
    (0.557)    (0.015)**   (0.507)   (0.007)*** 





















GDP per capita  -0.271  -0.256  -0.248  -0.198  -0.056  -0.032  -0.039  0.017 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.048)**  (0.024)**  (0.378) 
Growth  -10.063 -10.127 -9.139  -10.113 -4.608  -5.217  -7.304  -9.533 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Inflation  0.328 0.384 0.402 0.605 -0.246 -0.017 -0.411 -0.164 
  (0.208) (0.154) (0.130) (0.028)**  (0.241)  (0.937)  (0.055)* (0.451) 
Case  law  -0.120  -0.133      -0.208 -0.292    
  (0.039)** (0.028)**     (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Legal  justification      0.526  0.640    0.471  0.635 
     (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.077    0.098    0.046    0.051   
  (0.227)   (0.138)   (0.375)    (0.352)   
Supreme Court Power    0.074    0.203    0.223    0.310 
   (0.166)   (0.001)***  (0.000)***   (0.000)*** 
Observations  2246 2246 2115 2115 2978  2978  2806  2806 
 
Note: The underlying model is: Obstacle = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Private + β 5 Corporation + β 6 
Family +β 7 Board + β 8 Management + β 9 Manufacturing + β 10 Services + β 11 Sales +β 12 No. of Competitors +β 13 GDP per 
capita + β 14 Law  + β 15 Growth  + β 16 Inflation + ε. Managers were asked about the obstacles they face to the growth and 
operation of their firm. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major 
obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign 
ownership and zero if not. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Private and 
Corporation are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is (i) a single proprietorship or a partnership or (ii) a 
corporation. Family, Board and Management are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is controlled by (i) and 
individual or family, (ii) its board, or (iii) its management.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the 
logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Law is one of 
four variables. Tenure of Supreme Court Judges indicates the length of tenure of Supreme Court judges. Supreme Court 
Power is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if Supreme Court Judges have life-long tenure and jurisdiction over 
administrative cases. Case Law is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if judges base their decision on case law. 
Legal Justification indicates whether judgments are based on statutory law rather than on principles of equity. Growth is GDP 
growth averaged over 1995-99. Inflation is the log difference in the CPI, averaged over 1995-99. The regression is run with 
ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses 
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Table 8. Firms’ Obstacles to Growth, Legal Adaptability and Judicial 
























GDP per capita  -0.180  -0.183  -0.170  -0.174  -0.082  -0.106  -0.074  -0.093 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Case law  -0.168  -0.130      -0.157  -0.164     
 (0.004)*** (0.033)**     (0.005)***  (0.005)***     
Legal justification      0.190  0.140      0.330  0.350 
     (0.019)**  (0.103)      (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.019    0.057    -0.211    -0.217   
  (0.769)    (0.404)    (0.001)***   (0.002)***  
Supreme Court Power    -0.085    -0.072    -0.062    -0.046 
    (0.120)    (0.213)   (0.246)   (0.419) 





















GDP per capita  -0.389  -0.364  -0.376  -0.351  -0.064  -0.061  -0.061  -0.051 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.013)** 
Case law  -0.173  -0.173      -0.251  -0.314     
 (0.009)*** (0.012)**     (0.000)***  (0.000)***    
Legal justification      0.569  0.609      0.532  0.620 
     (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supreme Court Tenure  0.147    0.125    -0.059    -0.090   
 (0.040)**    (0.091)*    (0.354)    (0.191)   
Supreme Court Power    0.066    0.101    0.129    0.132 
   (0.277)    (0.122)    (0.016)**    (0.020)** 
Observations  2246 2246 2115 2115 2978 2978  2806  2806 
 
Note: The underlying model is: Obstacle = β 1 Government + β 2 Foreign + β 3 Exporter +  β 4 Private + β 5 Corporation + β 6 
Family +β 7 Board + β 8 Management + β 9 Manufacturing + β 10 Services + β 11 Sales +β 12 No. of Competitors +β 13 GDP per 
capita + β 14 Law + ε. Managers were asked about the obstacles they face to the growth and operation of their firm. Answers 
vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). We recode a dummy variable 
that takes on the value zero if the respective obstacle takes the value one or two and one otherwise. Government and Foreign 
are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not. Exporter is a 
dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm. Private and Corporation are dummy variables that indicate 
whether the firm is (i) a single proprietorship or a partnership or (ii) a corporation. Family, Board and Management are 
dummy variables that indicate whether the firm is controlled by (i) and individual or family, (ii) its board, or (iii) its 
management.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of 
Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Law is one of four variables. Tenure of Supreme 
Court Judges indicates the length of tenure of Supreme Court judges. Supreme Court Power is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value one if Supreme Court Judges have life-long tenure and jurisdiction over administrative cases. Case Law is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value one if judges base their decision on case law. Legal Justification indicates whether judgments 
are based on statutory law rather than on principles of equity. The regression is run with probit. Detailed variable definitions 




  Appendix Table: Variables and Sources   
     
Variable Definition  Original source  
Bank paperwork and 
bureaucracy 
Is bank paperwork/bureaucracy no obstacle (1), a minor 
obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Banks lack money  
to lend 
Is banks' lack of money to lend no obstacle (1), a minor 
obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Board  Dummy variable that takes on value one if major decisions 
concerning the enterprise’s direction are taken by its board of 
directors, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Caselaw  Dummy variable that takes on value one if judicial decisions 
are a source of law, zero otherwise.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Pop-Eleches and Shleifer 
(2004) 
Collateral requirements  Are collateral requirements of banks/financial institutions no 
obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a 
major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Corporation  Dummy variable that takes on value one if the firm is a 
corporation, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Creditor Rights  Index of secured creditor rights during restructuring or 
liquidation. Ranges from zero to four, with higher values 
indicating better creditor right protection. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny  (1997, 
1998) 
Exporter  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports, 
zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Family  Dummy variable that takes on value one if major decisions 
concerning the enterprise’s direction are taken by an 
individual or a family, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Foreign  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any foreign 
company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership 
of the firm, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
French legal origin  Dummy variable that takes on value one if the country’s legal 
origin is French, zero otherwise 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  
Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 
1999) 
GDP per capita  Real per capita GDP in US dollars, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators 
General Financing 
Obstacle 
How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of 
your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a 
moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Government  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any 
government agency or state body has a financial stake in the 
ownership of the firm, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Growth  Growth rate of GDP, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators 
Inflation rate  Log difference of Consumer Price Index  International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), line 64 
Legal justification  Sum of three dummy variables: (1) Complaint measures 
whether the complaint is required to include references to the 
applicable laws, legal reasoning or other formalities that 
normally require legal training or assistance, (2) Judgment 
indicates whether the judgment must expressly state the 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2003)  
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applicable law or case law for the decision, and (3) Law vs. 
Equity indicates whether judgment has to be based on 




Is the access to long-term finance no obstacle (1), a minor 
obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Management  Dummy variable that takes on value one if major decisions 
concerning the enterprise’s direction are taken by its 
management, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the 
manufacturing industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
No. of Competitors  Regarding your firm's major product line, how many 
competitors do you face in your market? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Private  Dummy variable that takes on value one if the firm is a single 
proprietorship or partnership, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Rule of Law  Measure of the law and order tradition of a country. It is an 
average over 1995-97. It ranges from 6, strong law and order 
tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition.  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). 
Sales  Logarithm of firm sales  World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Services  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the 
service industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Supreme Court Power  Dummy variable that takes on value one if administrative law 
judges have lifelong tenure and if either the administrative 
court is the Supreme Court or if cases judged by 
administrative courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court, 
zero otherwise. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Pop-Eleches and Shleifer 
(2004) 
Supreme Court Tenure  Takes on the value two if tenure is lifelong, one if tenure is at 
least six years but not lifelong and zero if tenure is less than 
six years 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Pop-Eleches and Shleifer 
(2004) 
      
 